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ABSTRACT 
The Global Observer is a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
initiative that is being managed by the United States Special Operations Command (US 
SOCOM).  The JCTD Program seeks to accelerate the development and operational 
evaluation of mature advanced technologies to rapidly transition the new capability to 
military operations. 
The Global Observer is a liquid-hydrogen powered unmanned aircraft system that 
has been designed for deployment as a stratospheric satellite. It will provide an 
affordable, persistent presence over any designated area of interest for surveillance and 
communications relay missions.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost savings, as well as the other 
benefits associated with the operational deployment of the Global Observer.  This thesis 
will (1) Develop a model for performing business case analyses of JCTDs, including 
defining the methodical structure required in the business case report; and (2) Conduct 
the Global Observer JCTD business case analysis, including a baseline analysis and a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis based on a developed operational scenario with 6 
designated areas of operations, while comparing the performance with an existing 
analogous system, i.e., the RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ..........................................................................1 
B. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
BANDWIDTH..................................................................................................2 
C.  LIQUID HYDROGEN (LH2) FUEL..............................................................3 
1. Combustion...........................................................................................3 
2. Electrochemical Conversion in a Fuel Cell........................................4 
D.  PROBLEM STATEMENTS...........................................................................5 
1. High Cost of Global Persistent Surveillance .....................................5 
2. High Cost and Shortage of Communications Bandwidth ................5 
E.  CASE FOR CHANGE — DOING THINGS BETTER ...............................6 
F.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS...............................................................................................7 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................9 
A.  CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES ......................................................................9 
1. Fossil-fueled UAVs...............................................................................9 
2. Satellites ..............................................................................................11 
3. High Altitude Airships.......................................................................12 
B.  JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD)..14 
1. The ACTD Program ..........................................................................15 
2. The JCTD Program ...........................................................................16 
C.  THE GLOBAL OBSERVER JCTD.............................................................17 
D.  BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES ....................................................................21 
1. Definition ............................................................................................22 
2. Data Collection...................................................................................23 
3. Evaluation Analysis ...........................................................................23 
4. Results Presentation...........................................................................23 
III. GLOBAL OBSERVER BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS ........................................25 
A.  OPERATIONAL SCENARIO......................................................................25 
1. Scenario Background.........................................................................26 
a. Trans-Sahara Region..............................................................26 
b. Afghanistan / Pakistan ...........................................................27 
c. Iraq ..........................................................................................28 
d. Colombia..................................................................................29 
e. Strait of Malacca.....................................................................29 
f. China / North Korea ...............................................................30 
2. UAV Operating Bases........................................................................31 
a. Beale Air Force Base (California, USA) ...............................31 
b. Anderson Air Force Base (Guam) .........................................31 
c. Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates)..........................32 
3. Selection of UAV Operating Base.....................................................32 
 viii
B.  DATA ANALYSIS .........................................................................................34 
1. Number of UAVs Required...............................................................34 
2. Number of Sorties Required Per Year by the UAVs ......................37 
3. Utility of the UAVs.............................................................................39 
4. Life Cycle Cost ...................................................................................40 
a. Aircraft Cost ............................................................................41 
b. Launch and Recovery System, Mission Control System 
Costs.........................................................................................41 
c. Payload Cost............................................................................41 
d. Fuel Cost .................................................................................41 
e. Maintenance and Repair Costs...............................................43 
5. Cost of Leased Commercial Satellite Communications .................45 
C.  RETURN ON INVESTMENT......................................................................46 
1. Base Case Benefits..............................................................................46 
2. Base Case ROI....................................................................................48 
D.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS...........................................................................49 
1. Discount Factor ..................................................................................50 
2. Investment and Operation Cost........................................................51 
3. LH2 Fuel Cost .....................................................................................52 
E.  RISK ANALYSIS...........................................................................................54 
1. Reliability of the Technology ............................................................54 
2. Logistical Support..............................................................................54 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................55 
A. PERFORMANCE..........................................................................................55 
B. COST BENEFITS..........................................................................................55 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS...........................................................................56 
D. RISK ANALYSIS...........................................................................................57 
E. BOTTOMLINE..............................................................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................67 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Growth in commercial satellite communications expenditure and 
bandwidth usage [From 13, Fig 2-1]......................................................6 
Figure 2. Composite Hull High Altitude Powered Platform (CHHAPP)  
[From 27] .............................................................................................13 
Figure 3. Lockheed Martin’s High Altitude Airship (HAA).  [From 28] ...........14 
Figure 4. DARPA’s ISIS Airship.  [From 30].....................................................14 
Figure 5. Global Observer prototype [From 34] .................................................18 
Figure 6. BCA methodology [From 39]..............................................................22 
Figure 7. World map [From 57] with annotation of UAV Operating bases 
and AO.................................................................................................33 
Figure 8. Typical mission sortie profile of the UAV ..........................................34 
Figure 9. Minimum number of aircraft required vs AO Distance.......................36 
Figure 10. Number of UAV sorties required per year vs AO distance .................38 
Figure 11. Number of UAV sorties required per year for mission........................39 
Figure 12. Utility of UAV for mission ..................................................................40 
Figure 13. Commercial satellite bandwidth usage by region [From 12, Fig 4-
15] ........................................................................................................45 
Figure 14. Expenditure on commercial satellite bandwidth by region [From  
12, Fig 4-14].........................................................................................45 
Figure 15. Discount factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] ..............................50 
Figure 16. Discount factor analysis on annualized ROI........................................51 
Figure 17. Cost factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] for the Global 
Observer...............................................................................................51 
Figure 18. Cost factor analysis on annualized ROI for the Global Observer........52 
Figure 19. Fuel cost factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] for the Global 
Observer...............................................................................................53 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. LCC comparison between Global Observer and Global Hawk......... xiv 
Table 2. Specifications of known long endurance UAVs..................................10 
Table 3. Global Observer Specifications [From 34] ..........................................19 
Table 4. Specific energy of commonly used fuels  [After 36]...........................20 
Table 5. Selection of operating base to launch the UAV...................................33 
Table 6. Cruise speed and endurance times for Global Hawk and Global 
Observer...............................................................................................35 
Table 7. UAV requirements for mission to respective AO................................37 
Table 8. Annual fuel cost incurred by the UAVs...............................................43 
Table 9. Costs to purchase and operate the UAVs over 15 years ......................44 
Table 10. Summary of the benefits of Global Observer ......................................48 
Table 11. LCC comparison between Global Observer and Global Hawk...........56 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Global Observer (GO) is an approved FY2007 Joint Capability Technology 
Demonstration (JCTD) initiative managed by the United States Special Operations 
Command (US SOCOM).  The purpose of the JCTD is to accelerate the development and 
operational evaluation of mature advanced technologies in order to rapidly transition the 
new capability to military operations.   
The Global Observer is a liquid-hydrogen powered unmanned aircraft system that 
has been designed for deployment as a stratospheric satellite. It will provide an 
affordable, persistent presence over any designated area of interest for surveillance and 
communications relay missions.  Designed for a flight endurance of seven days, the 
operational deployment of the Global Observer can significantly reduce the high costs 
associated with global persistent surveillance, as well as alleviate the problem of dealing 
with the shortage of communications bandwidth in the operational theatre.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost savings, as well as the other 
benefits associated with the operational deployment of the Global Observer.  This thesis 
will 
• Develop a recommended model for performing business case analyses of 
JCTDs, including defining the methodical structure required in the 
business case report. 
• Conduct the Global Observer JCTD business case analysis (BCA), 
including a baseline analysis and a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. 
The analysis will be based on a developed operational scenario with 6 
designated areas of operation (AO), while comparing the performance 
with an existing analogous system, i.e., the RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
 
The results of the analyses for a 24/7/365 persistent presence over the designated 





o A total of 20 Global Observers were required (including 6 ground 
spares for each of the AOs considered) for the mission, compared 
to 35 Global Hawks (including the 6 ground spares). 
o A total of 490 Global Observer sorties were required, compared to 
3051 for the Global Hawk.  This translates to a cost savings of 
90.7% on fuel costs. 
o For the various areas of operation, the utility (defined as the 
proportion of time spent on-station by the UAV) of the Global 
Observer ranged from 0.53 to 0.75, compared to 0.21 to 0.42 for 
the Global Hawk. 
 
• Cost Benefits 
o The estimated life cycle cost comparison (less manpower costs) 
over a 15-year period between the Global Observer and the Global 
Hawk are summarized in the following Table 1.   
 
Table 1.   LCC comparison between Global Observer and Global Hawk 
LCCE (FY05$M) 







Investment 412.4 1522.5 1110.1 72.9% 
Operations & 
Support 467.4 2429.0 1961.7 80.8% 
Total 879.8 3951.5 3071.8 77.7% 
 
o The estimated cost to purchase and operate the Global Observer for 
15 years is $879.8M (FY05$), compared to the Global Hawk’s cost 
of $3951.5M (FY05$).  This translates to a savings of 77.7%. 
o There is also an estimated potential cost avoidance of about $40M 
per annum on commercial satellite bandwidth usage if the Global 
 xv
Observer can be deployed to provide tactical battlefield 
communications over the area of interest, in addition to its regular 
ISR mission. 
o The base case annualized compounded Return on Investment 
(ROI) (over a 15-year period from FY091 [1]) is 14.3%, based on a 
Net Present Value (NPV) savings of $3071.8M and NPV 
Investment of $412.4M.   
 
• Sensitivity Analysis 
o The base case annualized ROI never falls below 12.4% when the 
discount factor for the Global Observer was varied from 3.0% to 
10%. 
o The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 8.5% even when 
the cost factor for the Global Observer is increased to double the 
current estimated cost.   
o The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 13.8% when the 
fuel cost of LH2 was varied from 1 to 3 times the current estimated 
burdened cost of $22.70 per pound, while maintaining a constant 
JP-8 burdened cost of $17.50 per gallon. 
 
• Risk Analysis 
o The reliability of the technology to achieve 7 days flight endurance 
remains unproven, as there was no demonstrator that has achieved 
such a capability.  
o For operational fielding, it is necessary to also look into the 
infrastructure and logistical support requirements, especially with 
regard to LH2 handling, to adequately support the Global Observer 
for missions from OCONUS forward operating bases. 
 
                                                 
1 Base Case Discount Rate was set at 5.05% [1]. 
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• Bottom Line 
o The benefits of the Global Observer should not be limited to the 
factors presented in this study, as these factors are by no means a 
comprehensive list.  The very concept of a HALE UAV achieving 
7 days flight endurance is already a ground-breaking capability, 
especially since currently, operational UAVs can achieve no more 
than 2 days of flight endurance.    
o The Global Observer with its prolonged persistence (7 days) and 
flexibility in payload configuration appears to be a worthwhile 
investment that can provide the DoD with a new capability in 
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A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The Global Observer is a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
project managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The JCTD program 
seeks to accelerate the development and operational evaluation of mature advanced 
technologies.  In the case of the Global Observer, which is a liquid-hydrogen powered 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the JCTD seeks to significantly reduce the high cost of 
global persistent surveillance and communications, as well as to alleviate the problem of 
dealing with the shortage of communications bandwidth in the operational theatre.  This 
goal is accomplished by using existing, proven systems to field an unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) as a stratospheric satellite. It would provide an affordable, persistent 
presence over any designated area of interest for surveillance and communications relay 
missions.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost savings, as well as other benefits 
associated with the operational deployment of the Global Observer Program.  This thesis 
will: 
• Develop a model for performing business case analyses of JCTDs, 
including defining the methodical structure required in the business case 
report. 
• Conduct the Global Observer JCTD business case analysis (BCA), with a 
baseline analysis followed by sensitivity analysis, as well as a general risk 
assessment for the Global Observer.  The BCA compares the performance 
of Global Observer with Global Hawk in an operational scenario 
consisting of a 24/7/365 ISR (intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance) and communications mission.  Life Cycle Costs consist of 
investment costs as well as the costs to operate the platform over a 15-year 
period.   
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B. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
BANDWIDTH 
“Surveillance” is the monitoring of behavior.  It refers to the “close observation” 
[2] of a person or groups of persons.  In the military context, surveillance allows friendly 
forces to monitor the activities of their targets and determine the best opportunity to 
commence with their next course of action.  This capability is achieved with the aid of 
technologies that provide surveillance on any designated area as determined by the 
commander.   
The effectiveness of all surveillance assets is related to their ability to stay on-
station for extended periods of time.  Ceteris Paribus, a surveillance asset that has a 
higher Effective Time-On-Station (ETOS)2 [3], would naturally be preferred to one that 
has a lower ETOS.  The objective is to achieve persistent surveillance, where the 
commander is able to see a continually updated situation picture that remains accurate 
and relevant.   
Persistent surveillance enables the commander to lift the veil from the “fog of 
war” in many military situations, ranging from tactical warfighting situations in open 
terrain to conflicts in high density urban areas.  This allows the commander to exploit the 
information, thus enabling him to make timely and accurate command decisions that can 
be put into action.  According to Dr Bially, who is the Director of DARPA’s Information 
Exploitation Office, “We’ve learned that occasional or periodic snapshots don’t tell us 
enough of what we need to know.  In order to really understand what’s going on we have 
to observe our adversaries and their environment 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
week-in and week-out…we have to constantly upgrade our understanding of the enemy’s 
inherent motives so that we can effectively shape the battlespace to avoid further 
hostilities.” [4]   
                                                 
2 Effective Time-On-Station (ETOS) is a reliability parameter used for systems that are designed to 
provide coverage (surveillance, defense, etc.) for a specified amount of time.  It measures the ability of a 
system to remain operational for the scheduled on-station time.   
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Communications bandwidth, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of any given 
communications channel.  If the available bandwidth is higher, then greater amounts of 
data and information can be transmitted and received using the communications channel.  
Bandwidth is required for the transmission of text (e.g., emails and documents), voice 
(e.g., audio streaming and tele-conversation) and video (e.g., video streaming and video-
conferencing).  A high bandwidth environment is critical for time-sensitive 
communication.    
C.  LIQUID HYDROGEN (LH2) FUEL 
Hydrogen is the most common element in the universe, constituting about 75% of 
the universe’s elemental mass, and 90% of the universe (by atom count) [5].   It possesses 
the highest energy content per unit weight of any known fuel.  However, hydrogen is 
rarely found occurring by itself in nature - it is almost always found in a combined form 
with other elements such as oxygen (in water) or carbon (in fossil fuels).   In its elemental 
state, hydrogen is a clean energy carrier.  It is non-polluting, as the primary emission is 
water.   
The use of liquid hydrogen (LH2) in fuel, though not prevalent in present-day 
applications, is not new, and can be implemented in one of two ways [6]: 
• Combustion  
• Electrochemical conversion in a fuel cell 
1. Combustion 
In combustion, hydrogen is burned to generate power using an internal 
combustion engine.  This is similar to how traditional gasoline cars burn gas.   
The invention of the internal combustion engine in 1807 was credited to Francois 
Isaac de Rivaz of Switzerland, who used a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen for fuel.  
Though not widespread today due to the lack of an established hydrogen economy, 
hydrogen is already used to power automobiles, with the BMW Hydrogen-7 being the 
most notable.  For aircraft, the then Soviet Union had, in April 1988, successfully flown 
the Tupolev TU-154 plane using LH2 fuel. 
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2. Electrochemical Conversion in a Fuel Cell 
Using fuel cell technology, hydrogen reacts with oxygen to produce water and 
electricity, and this electricity is used to power an electric traction motor.   
A fuel cell [7] is a device that uses hydrogen (or a hydrogen-rich fuel) and oxygen 
to create electricity by an electrochemical process.  A single cell consists of an electrolyte 
sandwiched between two thin electrodes (a porous anode and a cathode).  Hydrogen, or a 
hydrogen-rich fuel, is fed to the anode where a catalyst separates hydrogen's negatively 
charged electrons from the positively charged protons.  The protons are conducted 
through the electrolyte to the cathode, whereas the electrons are forced to travel in an 
external circuit, due to the electrically insulating electrolyte used, resulting in an 
electrical current being generated.  At the cathode, oxygen combines with electrons and 
the protons to form water.     
The principle of the fuel cell was discovered in 1838 by Christian Friedrich 
Schönbein, a German scientist who is better known as the inventor of guncotton.  From 
his work, Welsh scientist Sir William Robert Grove developed the first fuel cell in 1843.  
In the 1950s, W. Thomas Grubb, who was then a chemist working for the General 
Electric Company (CE), modified the original fuel cell design by making use of a 
sulphonated polystyrene ion-exchange membrane as the electrolyte.  His colleague, 
Leonard Niedrach, discovered that depositing platinum onto the membrane could 
catalyze the necessary redox reactions for oxygen and hydrogen respectively, resulting in 
the development of the “Grubb-Niedrach fuel cell,” which was subsequently used by 
NASA on the Gemini space project in 1965 [8].  Today, NASA's space shuttles use 
hydrogen-powered fuel cells to operate electrical systems and the key emission, water, is 
consumed by the crew. 
In the case of the Global Observer, the high specific energy content of LH2 
(factor of 3:1 compared to gasoline) is exploited and harnessed to significantly increase 
the flight endurance of the UAV.   
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D.  PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
At the strategic and operational level, two key problems that are often the bugbear 
of decision-makers and commanders are as follows: 
1. High Cost of Global Persistent Surveillance 
With America at the forefront of various military and OOTW operations around 
the world, expenditures of this kind, particularly in the area of ISR (intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance) technologies, would make up a sizeable portion of the 
annual defense budget, which is $481.4b [9] for FY08. Some of this invariably goes 
towards funding the various surveillance platforms, e.g., satellites and HALE UAVs 
(High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), as well as the 
communications backbone that will provide the U.S. with a global surveillance network.   
Briefly, the high cost associated with the use of satellites is largely due to the fact 
that once launched into space, there is no way to recover it.  Hence, for cost effectiveness, 
the technology used must be good for at least the typical 15-year useful life-span of the 
satellite.  In addition, there is no guarantee that the satellite will successfully reach orbit 
as planned, further exacerbating the risks of launching a satellite.   
In the case of HALE UAVs, current technology, which makes use of traditional 
fossil fuels to power them, is such that the longest flight time of a UAV is no more than 
one to two days.  Missions that require 24/7/365 coverage would be prohibitively 
expensive due to the many sorties required to sustain such an operation.  Their high fuel 
consumption and frequent turn-around would also require a high level of logistics 
support, further increasing the cost of fielding such systems. 
2. High Cost and Shortage of Communications Bandwidth 
The availability of the communications network is a prerequisite to networked 
forces.   Whether in the theatre-of-operations, where there is a lack of a terrestrial 
communications network, or reach-back from in-theatre to the Pentagon, networking is 
achieved through the use of satellite communications.  In both instances, bandwidth 
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remains a scarce resource.  As the U.S. military moves towards operating in a net-centric 
environment, the reliance and the dependence on the communications network will 
continue to increase, fuelled by the insatiable thirst for communications bandwidth.     
The Pentagon maintains four satellites [10] for its dedicated use; these are 
reserved for the highest priority voice and simple data communications.  All other forms 
of communication would have to be transmitted via commercial satellites that are leased 
by the Department of Defense (DoD).  This limited available bandwidth is often maxed 
out during operations, which can affect the smooth running of operations.  Additionally, 
the cost of leasing commercial satellite bandwidth is very expensive.  The result is a 
significant increase in the DoD usage and expenditure [11] of commercial satellite 
bandwidth in recent years, from $91M in 2000 (bandwidth consumed is 1324MHz) to 
$330M in 2005 (6444MHz).  Figure 1 shows the growth in commercial satellite 
expenditures and bandwidth usage from the 2000 to 2005: 
 
Figure 1.   Growth in commercial satellite communications expenditure and 
bandwidth usage [From 13, Fig 2-1] 
 
E.  CASE FOR CHANGE — DOING THINGS BETTER 
The Global Information Grid [12] is an all-encompassing communications project 
of the DoD.   It will be a net-centric system [13], operating in a global context to provide 
processing, storage, management, and transport of information to support all DoD, 
national security, and related intelligence community missions and functions.  The 
functions will be varied: strategic, operational, tactical, and business- in war, in crisis, 
and in peace.  The goal of the program is to enable the military forces to achieve 
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information superiority over its potential adversaries.  As former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz aptly put it, “[we must] leverage information technology and 
innovative network-centric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint 
forces.  Our ability to leverage the power of information and networks will be key to our 
success…” [14].   
It is therefore imperative that new technologies be harnessed to continually 
improve the network that will equip the military forces with power to the edge [15] 
capabilities.  Specifically, the Global Observer JCTD seeks to significantly reduce the 
high cost of global persistent surveillance and communications, as well as alleviate the 
problem of dealing with the shortage of communications bandwidth. 
F.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
To achieve the objectives set out in Section A, the author will develop and 
recommend an analytic structure for performing business case analyses (BCA).  The 
BCA for the Global Observer JCTD will be conducted based on the structure.  This thesis 
would report on the results of the Global Observer JCTD BCA and formulate the 
appropriate recommendations to the decision makers.    
The extent of comprehensiveness to which this thesis presents the BCA is limited 
to the data and information made available to the author.  The cost saving obtained, 
though specific to the operational scenario, can be used to derive the savings for other 
similar scenarios within reasonable assumptions. 
Key assumptions made while performing the BCA are as follows: 
• A conservative approach is adopted, i.e., whenever a choice had to made 
between higher and lower costs due to ambiguity in the data, the higher 
cost is used.  
 
• Where information is not available, or not made available to the author, 
estimates are used and reasonable assumptions are made in regards as to 
how they are derived. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
This section provides an overview of the key technologies that are currently 
employed for global surveillance and communications missions.  It also includes new 
technologies that are being developed to alleviate the high cost of global persistent 
surveillance, as well as addressing the problem of the existing shortage of bandwidth 
resources.  A summary of the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
Program is also explained here, with details on the history and development of the Global 
Observer JCTD Program.  Finally, the section concludes with an overview of the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) methodology. 
A.  CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
The three main types of technologies that are being deployed, or are in the process 
of being developed, for surveillance and communications missions, along with some top-
level advantages and disadvantages, are as follows: 
• Fossil-fueled UAVs (flexible deployment, but limited loiter capability). 
• Satellites (inflexible deployment, but persistent loiter capability).  
• High Altitude Airships (relatively flexible deployment, with persistent 
loiter capability). 
The current state of these technologies is that these solutions are generally either 
not cost effective or not readily available (still under development).  In addition, they 
may also not be practical for large-scale implementation.    
1. Fossil-fueled UAVs 
UAVs can be rapidly deployed to different designated areas for surveillance, and 
this makes them a highly prized sensor asset.  Various types of UAVs have also been 
developed and designed to carry the required payload configuration for their respective 
missions.  This payload modularity allows UAVs to be rapidly reconfigured for a variety 
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of missions.  However, the main drawback in current UAV technologies is the fact that 
they are powered by traditional fossil fuels, which limits aircraft endurance.    
The aircraft endurance of the internal combustion engine depends strongly on the 
percentage of fuel burned compared to its total weight, and this is largely independent of 
aircraft size.  Hence, their flight duration and resulting loiter capability on-station is 
highly dependent on the amount of fuel carried on-board vis-à-vis their mission payload.  
Furthermore, the absence of any in-flight refueling capability for UAVs means that their 
ability to remain on-station for extended periods of time is severely limited.   
For comparison, the operating ceiling, flight endurance and cruise speeds of 
several known long endurance UAVs are given in Table 2. 
 










MQ-1 Predator  
[16] 25,000 40 hours 70 
 
RQ-4A Global Hawk 
[17] 65,000 35 hours 340 
 
MQ-9 Predator-B 




38 hours  
48 minutes 80 
 
IAI Heron 




From Table 2, it is evident that the endurance of current fossil fuel powered long 
endurance UAVs is typically no more than two days.  Missions that require 24/7/365 
coverage would be prohibitively expensive due to the many aircraft and sorties required.  
Their high fuel consumption and frequent turn-around would also require a high level of 
logistics support, further increasing the cost of fielding such systems.  In addition, 
damage risks associated with the frequent launching and recovery of these UAVs would 
also be fairly high. 
It is therefore apparent that current fossil-fueled UAVs are not adequate, in a life-
cycle-cost sense, for missions that require all-year round persistent time-on-stations. 
2. Satellites 
The main strength of satellites is their ability to provide 24/7/365 persistent time-
on-station capability for any given mission.  However, they also have many inherent 
disadvantages.  First, satellites are usually not recoverable, i.e., once launched into space 
orbit, they cannot be easily retrieved, if at all.  Furthermore, in view of the huge costs 
associated with sending a satellite into space for a mission, a satellite’s typical useful 
lifespan must be for a period of at least five to ten years to be cost effective.  As a 
consequence, the technology used by the satellite must be good for at least its entire 
useful lifespan, as maintenance in-service would probably be more expensive than a 
replacement.  The satellite must also have sufficient power to meet its operational 
requirements over its entire lifespan.  As such, the cost to operate a satellite can be 
several times more expensive than that of a UAV.  For example, the cost to launch a 
satellite can vary between $50M to $400M [21].   
The complexities involved in launching and managing the satellite cannot be 
taken lightly.  Many potential problems could arise to terminate the satellite mission 
prematurely, or even the satellite itself.  These include the problems caused during the 
delicate launch process (e.g., Atlas V, Taurus), power system failure (e.g., Thaicom 3), 
software glitches (e.g., XM3, Yamal 202, Satmax 5), data transfer (e.g., Mars Global 
Surveyor), hardware failures (e.g., Suzaku, Galaxy 10R) or even faulty designs (e.g., 
Intelsat 804, SSETI Express).  These problems are further compounded by the 
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uncertainty of the space environment in which the satellite operates (e.g. Gravity Probe 
B).  Examples of failed satellites and satellite missions abound [22].   
In the context of multi-mission capabilities, satellites are far less flexible in that 
they can only perform the type of missions they were designed for.  For instance, if an 
imagery satellite is launched, it cannot be reconfigured easily, if at all, to become a 
communications satellite.  This is because the payload to be mounted on the satellite is 
decided based on the mission and cannot be changed after launch, due to the sheer 
impossibility of recovering launched satellites for reuse.  Any significant changes in 
operational requirements after launch would normally result in having another satellite 
take its place, making it a very tedious and very expensive process.  It is thus evident that 
satellites do not enjoy the flexibility of reconfiguration and technology refreshment 
enjoyed by many other platforms, such as UAVs or airships, which can be recovered after 
being launched.   
An example is that of the IKONOS [23] satellite, a commercial earth observation 
satellite that was launched in 1999 with a mission duration of 7 years.  Its core mission is 
to provide high-resolution imagery, and its payload is configured as such.  It cannot, 
therefore, be used for a totally different mission, e.g., as a communications or 
navigational satellite without the appropriate equipment and payload.  To reconfigure the 
imagery satellite to perform any other function (e.g., for communications or navigational 
purposes) without the requisite equipment already configured on board is virtually 
impossible.  
3. High Altitude Airships 
Airships have been used for a variety of missions, both military and commercial, 
since the early 1900s, with mixed success.   
Airships were deployed during World War I [24] by both the Allied and the 
Central Powers in scouting and observation roles.  Airships were also deployed by the 
U.S. during World War II in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), as well as for patrol and 
convoy escort near the U.S. coastline.  Commercial applications include using the lighter-
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than-air aircraft for advertising and even as media platforms for aerial video  
and photography at major sporting events.     
However, airship deployment was not without problems.  Notable failures include 
the British R101 Airship accident (1930), the USS Akron crash (1933), as well as the LZ 
129 Hindenberg Disaster (1937).   
Despite the airship’s existence for many decades, the concept of developing the 
airship’s capabilities for high altitude and long endurance deployment only gathered 
steam in recent years.  Essentially, the idea is to deploy a self-sustainable airship into the 
stratosphere for long endurance missions, due to its ability to stay in the air for extended 
periods of time (i.e., ranging from weeks to months at a stretch).  The airship, which will 
be powered by a solar-electric power storage system, will be able to sustain its 
operational requirements.  Their long endurance capability translates into a relatively 
lower operational and maintenance cost for the airship.  Furthermore, their ability to stay 
in the stratosphere means that they are not susceptible to a vast majority of traditional 
adversarial weapon threats.  They can also be rapidly reconfigured for a variety of 
missions, depending on the specific operational requirements. 
The current forerunner developments [25] in this field are as follows: 
• Composite Hull High Altitude Powered Platform (CHHAPP) [26] (also 
known as HiSentinel High-Altitude Airship) effort by U.S. Army, U.S. Air 
Force, Southwest Research Institute and Aerostar International.  The first 
test flight took place in 2005.  The CHHAPP is shown in Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2.   Composite Hull High Altitude Powered Platform (CHHAPP)  [From 27] 
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• Lockheed Martin’s High Altitude Airship (HAA) [28], sponsored by the 
US Army Space and Missile Defense Command.  The production HAA 
will be able to stay aloft at 65,000 ft. for six months at a time.  The first 
test flight is scheduled in 2010.  The HAA is shown in Figure 3 below: 
 
Figure 3.   Lockheed Martin’s High Altitude Airship (HAA).  [From 28] 
 
• The ISIS (Integrated Sensor IS Structure) program [29] by DARPA 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) seeks to develop a 
stratospheric surveillance airship.  The technological demonstrator is 
scheduled to fly in 2010.  The ISIS airship is shown in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 4.   DARPA’s ISIS Airship.  [From 30] 
 
However, with the as yet uncompleted development and testing of these 
capabilities, any possible operational deployment would still be some years away.    
B.  JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD) 
The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program has its roots in 
the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program, which had its 
inception in 1994 by the Department of Defense (DoD).  The program is headed by the 
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Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts), DUSD(AS&C), 
who has a team of ACTD/JCTD oversight executives who interact with the various 
AS&C divisions to harvest capabilities for the Combatant Commands. 
1. The ACTD Program 
The ACTD program [31] has its origins in the Packard Commission and Defense 
Science Board studies.  The program was aimed at helping the DoD acquisition process 
adapt to present-day economic and threat environments.  By focusing on technology 
assessment and integration, a prototype capability could be provided to the operational 
warfighter and could support his evaluation of the military utility of the capability.  As 
such, ACTDs seek to exploit both mature and maturing technologies, and to transit the 
new capability into the hands of the operational warfighter.   
ACTDs can be characterized by their employment of mature technologies over a 
fixed period of activity.  They can also leverage existing technological investments.  
There is also a residual capability after the completion of the ACTD demonstration.  In 
addition, ACTDs have a heavy focus on joint operations with Combatant Command 
warfighter participation, as well as a significant level of cross-service, cross 
agency/organization involvement.   
The guidelines [32] developed to provide guidance for the selection criteria for 
ACTD candidates are given as follows: 
• The timeframe for completing the evaluation of military utility is typically 
2–4 years. 
• The technology should be sufficiently mature. 
• The project provides a potentially effective response to a priority military 
need. 
• A lead service or agency has been designated. 
• The risks have been identified, are understood, and accepted. 
• Demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide an 
adequate basis for the utility assessment. 
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• Funding is sufficient to complete the planned assessment of utility and to 
provide technical support for the first two years of fielding the interim 
capability. 
• The developer is ready to prepare a plan that covers all essential aspects.  
These include affordability, interoperability, sustainability, and 
evolutionary capability, vis-à-vis technology and threat changes. 
The objectives of the ACTD are to conduct meaningful demonstrations of the 
capability, develop and test concepts of operations to optimize military effectiveness, and 
prepare to transition the capability into acquisition without loss of momentum, if 
warranted.  An additional goal of the ACTD is to provide a residual capability to further 
refine CONOPS and to permit continued use prior to formal acquisition, as well as to 
provide the ability to proceed into formal acquisition for additional capability, if required. 
Possible outcomes after the ACTD operational demonstration are as follows: 
• The user sponsor may recommend the acquisition of the technology and 
field the residual capability that remains at the completion of the 
demonstration phase of the ACTD to provide an interim and limited 
operational capability; 
• The user’s need is fully satisfied by the residual capability remaining at 
the conclusion of the ACTD, and there is no requirement to acquire any 
additional units of the system; 
• The capability is deemed to not demonstrate sufficient military utility, 
resulting in the project being terminated or returned to the technology 
base. 
2. The JCTD Program 
In FY2006, a new ACTD business process was initiated to update the successful 
ACTD program to meet the DoD’s transformational goal of becoming capability-based, 
rather than threat-based, in its focus.  This program, which was named the Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program [33], includes many of the 
positive aspects of the ACTD program, as well as improvements to meet new and 
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evolving defense challenges.  The process will integrate the ACTD program with the new 
Joint Integration and Development System (JCIDS) developed by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS).   
Current ACTD processes will be transited to the improved JCTD program over a 
3-5 year transition period, with the intent of having the JCTDs replace the ACTDs.  The 
new process will focus on joint and transformational technologies that are initiated in 
Science and Technology (S&T), and carried through the difficult transition stage.  The 
new JCTD business model will also include a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) pilot 
program that will take a limited number of “joint peculiar” JCTDs past Milestone B, into 
procurement, followed by initial sustainment – a “cradle-to-grave” approach.   
Similar to the ACTD program, the JCTD program possesses 3 possible transition 
models post-demonstration.  They are: 
• Transition to Program of Record (POR).  The military utility of 
the program has been successfully demonstrated, and the concepts will be 
adopted by the warfighters.  Products will be transferred to a new/current 
POR or GSA (Government Services Administration) schedule.  The 
acquisition of additional capability will also be funded. 
• Interim Capability to Meet Needs of the Warfighter. The military utility 
has been successfully demonstrated, and the concepts will be adopted by 
the warfighter.  However, the products may or may not have been sent to a 
POR.  This interim capability fully meets the warfighter’s needs and is 
being maintained. 
• Return to Technology Base. The military utility is deemed to be not 
successfully demonstrated.  Relevant components or capabilities may be 
incorporated into other systems, returned to the technology base or 
terminated. 
C.  THE GLOBAL OBSERVER JCTD 
The Global Observer (GO) is a Liquid Hydrogen (LH2)-powered High Altitude 
Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HALE UAV) program.  It was developed to 
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alleviate the problem of dealing with the high cost of global persistent surveillance and 
communications, as well as the shortage of communications bandwidth in the theatre-of-
operations.   
The Global Observer is being developed by AeroVironment Inc.  Since 1995, the 
company has been active in pursuing R&D (research and development) in various 
technology enablers that are foundational to the development of the Global Observer.  
These include development in composite airframes, electric motors, LH2 tank and 
propulsion, redundant flight controls and payload integration.  This culminated in a one-
third scale limited-payload prototype of the Global Observer (GO-0), taking its maiden 
flight in May 2005.  In doing so, the Global Observer became the first liquid-hydrogen 
powered unmanned aircraft system tested in the world.  The prototype is shown in Figure 
5 below: 
 
Figure 5.   Global Observer prototype [From 34] 
 
In 2007, the Global Observer was validated by the OSD as a “new start” JCTD to 
Congress, with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the Technical 
Manager to lead the JCTD.  Through the JCTD Program, OSD seeks to accelerate the 
development and operational evaluation of this technology.  For the JCTD, the 175-foot 
wingspan GO-1 will be capable of carrying a payload of 400 lbs, with 7-day flight 
duration, and the scheduled completion to be in 2009.  It is envisioned that the 
operational Global Observer (GO-2) will be a 250-foot wingspan UAV that can carry a 
payload of 1000lbs., with 7-day flight duration, scheduled to be completed in 2010.  The 
specifications of the Global Observer are as given in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Global Observer Specifications [From 34] 
Global Observer Specifications GO-1 GO-2 
Maximum Take-Off Weight (lbs) 3980 9870 
Wingspan (feet) 175 250 
Length (feet) 160 262 
Payload (lbs) 400 1000 
Endurance (days) 7 7 
Operating Ceiling (feet) 65,000 65,000 
Speed (knots) 110 110 
 
Equipped with this “persistence” capability, the Global Observer is a potentially 
highly valuable asset that can be used in both ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance) and communications missions, specifically as a wide-band 
communications relay node.  In addition, if the Global Observer is able to demonstrate 
the JCTD requirements of attaining 7-day flight endurance at 65,000 feet, maintaining 
altitude at that height would mean that it would be safe from most conventional weapons 
except the “satellite-killers” [35].  Like any other UAV of similar size, the Global 
Observer can be easily launched, recovered and relocated.  The significant payload 
capability of the Global Observer, at 400lbs. for GO-1 and 1000lbs. for GO-2, allows a 
great deal of flexibility for rapid upgrading and reconfiguration of the Global Observer to 
different payloads as operational requirements evolve.   
The LH2 fuel used by the Global Observer enables it to sustain a much longer 
endurance, as compared to UAVs powered by traditional fossil fuels.  This is due to the 
significantly higher specific energy of LH2 compared to other fuels.  As a guide, the 
following Table 4 illustrates the specific energy [36] of commonly used fuels. 
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Table 4.   Specific energy of commonly used fuels  [After 36] 
Energy Density 
By mass By Volume Energy Type 
MJ/kg MJ/L 
Hydrazine 1.6 1.6 
LPG 34.39 22.16 
Jet A Aviation Fuel 42.8 33 
Diesel 45.8 38.7 
Gasoline 46.9 34.6 
Compressed Natural Gas at 200 bar 53.6 10 
Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) 120 8 
 
In addition, the use of liquid hydrogen, which is a clean energy carrier, means that 
the water and electricity produced by the fuel cells do not contribute to any greenhouse 
gas emissions, unlike traditional fossil fuel powered aircraft.  Furthermore, it does not 
matter whether or not the production GO-2 makes use of fuel-cell technology or runs on 
an internal combustion engine [37]. The fact that both of these technologies have been in 
use for several decades now would likely indicate that the complexity involved in the 
design and implementation of the propulsion system would not be an overwhelming cost 
variable.  It is noted that in the GO-0 prototype test flight conducted in 2005, the global 
observer was powered using fuel-cell technology.   
Potential challenges involved in the development of the Global Observer that 
were not tested during the 2005 test flight include the amount of LH2 that can be carried 
for each flight to sustain the greater than 7-day endurance touted.  As the LH2 stored on 
board in tanks are at extremely low temperatures (boiling point of H2 is 20.28K), 
insulation of the tanks is crucial to the entire operation.   
In summary, for operational deployment in ISR as well as for communications 
missions, the Global Observer UAS possesses the flexibility for rapid payload 
configuration (1000 lbs. payload for GO-2), while still maintaining a significant time on-
station (at least 7 days endurance) at a high altitude (at 65,000 feet) for extended 
deployments.  In terms of the technology maturity, the Global Observer is expected to be 
ready by 2010, which is in a time frame that is much sooner than future technologies like 
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the HAA.  It also possesses many advantages over its existing competitors, such as 
satellites, as well as fossil-fueled UAVs, e.g., RQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
On September 26, 2007, it was announced that Aerovironment Inc. had been 
awarded a $57m contract [38] from SOCOM for the development and military utility 
assessment of the Global Observer.  The cost-plus fixed-fee arrangement basic contract 
calls for the development of up to three GO aircraft over the next three years.  The 
contract also includes options for the development and delivery of up to two additional 
GO aircraft, which gives an overall potential contract value of $108m. 
D.  BUSINESS CASE ANALYSES 
A Business Case Analysis [39] (BCA) is a fundamental tool used by decision-
makers to evaluate different alternatives and then decide on the best courses of action 
required in the allocation of scarce resources.  The BCA, which is a structured and 
systematic methodology, provides a best-value analysis that considers not only cost, but 
also other quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors that support the investment decision.   
It is an iterative process that is conducted and updated as required throughout the 
life cycle of the program, due to the evolution and changes of the program plans in the 
business and mission environment.  A typical BCA would include the following 
elements: 
• The objectives of the case.  
• The methods, assumptions and constraints.   
• Possible alternatives, including the current status quo. 
• The costs and benefits of each alternative in the scenario. 
• Sensitivity analysis and risk analysis.   
• Conclusions and suitable recommendations. 
As a decision-making tool, the quality and reliability of the BCA is crucial in 
enabling the decision maker to make an informed choice.  As such, the BCA process 
provides the decision maker with the relevant insights as to how the project supports the 
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strategic objectives and how it can achieve these objectives.  This assessment is 
structured such that pertinent information on the scope, alternatives, costs and benefits 
are laid out clearly, with the potential risks highlighted so that the decision-maker can 
make an informed decision on whether to invest in the project. 
As no two BCAs are alike in the objectives, assumptions, constraints, risk and 
operating scenario, it is necessary that the BCA being developed is customized for the 
particular case given the operating environment, i.e., there is no one size fits all solution.   
However, a generic BCA methodology can be described as a 4-phase process as shown in 
Figure 6.   
 
Figure 6.   BCA methodology [From 39] 
 
The steps to the process are: 
1. Definition 
In the first phase, the scope, assumptions and constraints will be defined to guide 
the analysis.  Alternative options are also explored to ensure that there is a minimum of 
two outcomes (one of which could be maintaining the current status quo) available at the 
end of the analysis.   
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2. Data Collection 
In the second phase, a data collection plan is devised, so that the types of data 
required, the data sources, and how they can be obtained, can be mapped out.  Models 
will also have to be developed so that the data can be categorized and stored, while 
preserving the data integrity.  Data normalization is also applied where required.  Where 
the data is not available, estimates can be made, as long as they can be justified, and the 
methodology adopted explained clearly. 
3. Evaluation Analysis 
The third phase is where most of the actual BCA work is being accomplished.  
Data analysis is performed to build the case for each alternative.  Alternatives are 
compared against the baseline and with one another to determine the alternative that 
provides the optimal cost-benefit combination.  Risk analysis is performed to identify the 
set of risks associated with each alternative, along with proposed risk-mitigating 
strategies.  Sensitivity analysis is also performed to provide insights as to how changes in 
key parameters or underlying assumptions and constraints that were made could 
influence the outcome of the analysis. 
4. Results Presentation 
The fourth and final phase is where the results are communicated to the decision 
maker.  The information presented should be concise, with relevant supporting evidence 
from the previous phases.  A conclusion and recommended course of action should also 
be provided to the decision maker based on the objectives defined in phase 1.   
In summary, once completed, the BCA should be able to determine the following: 
• The relative cost vs. benefits of different strategies.  
• The methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs.  
• The impact and value of Performance / Cost / Schedule / Sustainment 
tradeoffs.  
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• Data required to support and justify the strategy.  
• Sensitivity of the data to change.  
• Analysis and classification of risks.  
• A recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for 
proceeding with the best value alternative. 
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III. GLOBAL OBSERVER BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
This section sets the scenarios of how the comparison of capabilities between 
Global Hawk and Global Observer will be conducted.  These scenarios fully stress the 
round-the-clock intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and the 
communication relay missions assigned to these platforms.  The business case analysis 
will be performed based on the comparison of these platforms performing high intensity 
operations.  First, the scenario on which the analysis is performed will be elaborated.  The 
available data will then be analyzed.  This is followed by a computation on the return-on-
investment, as well as sensitivity analysis on the key obtained.  Finally, a general risk 
assessment for the Global Observer is made.   
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the benefits that Global Observer 
brings, vis-à-vis the existing Global Hawk ISR platform.  This analysis also factors in the 
communications support provided by satellites to perform tactical battlefield 
communications, and the cost comparison between the satellites and these two UAV 
platforms.  An operational advantage to UAVs that cannot be quantified is the ability of 
re-tasking the UAV and positioning it to support quick-reaction tactical ground 
operations. 
A.  OPERATIONAL SCENARIO3 
The operational scenario of this analysis is based on a strategic employment plan 
of these ISR platforms (i.e., the Global Observer or the Global Hawk) over six areas of 
interest which reflect a U.S. National Security Strategy.  These ISR missions require 
continuous coverage, and additionally, they perform tactical battlefield communications 
missions in Afghanistan and in Iraq in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  The 
following six regions form the tasking requirements for the analytical scenarios: 
                                                 
3 The crafting of the operational scenario was based on discussions with COL (Ret) Edward 
Lesnowicz, USMC, who is a Research Advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School.  His previous 
appointments include being the Chief of Staff of Marine Forces Europe as well as the Commanding Officer 
of the 11th Marine Regiment.  COL (Ret) Lesnowicz holds a Masters in Public Policy at the School of 
Advanced International Studies at the John Hopkins University. 
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• Trans-Sahara Region.  To support the Trans-Sahara Counter-
terrorism Initiative (TSCI). 
• Afghanistan / Pakistan. To support the on-going military operations 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
• Iraq. To support Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify and 
Neutralize) and the on-going peace-support operations in Iraq. 
• Colombia. To support the on-going fight against the illegal flow of 
drugs into CONUS (CONtinental United States). 
• Strait of Malacca. To maintain surveillance of possible terrorist 
activities that would restrict a ship’s passage across the narrow strait. 
• China / North Korea. To maintain U.S. surveillance of nuclear facilities 
and military defenses in the region. 
1. Scenario Background 
The global threat to U.S. interest is significant.  In order to develop a realistic 
scenario and identify the operational requirements that the Global Hawk and Global 
Observer must meet the following descriptions of the security environment of the United 
States is developed.  
a. Trans-Sahara Region 
The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) [40] is a State Department funded program 
initiated in November 2002 in the northern African countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
and Chad.  It was designed to enhance border capabilities, track movement of people 
(especially transnational terrorists), combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation 
and stability.  Its goals support two U.S. national security interests in Africa, namely 
waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security. 
As follow-on to the successful PSI, the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism 
Initiative (TSCI) [41] was introduced in 2005.  The TSCI is a multi-facet, multi-year 
strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional 
counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the 
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region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist 
ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the U.S.  The overall goals are to 
enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, 
Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) regions, to confront the challenge posed 
by terrorist organizations in the region, and to facilitate cooperation between those 
countries and the Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in the global war on 
terror.  
The deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global Hawk or Global Observer 
type) would be able to significantly enhance the U.S. forces’ ISR capabilities in this 
effort.  In addition, with the heavy reliance on commercial satellite communications due 
to the lack of existing terrestrial networks, the Global Observer would also function as an 
airborne communications satellite for in-theatre communications.  Due to the large 
geographical region to be covered, the mission requires two UAV assets (based on the 
UAV footprint) to cover this north African region. 
b. Afghanistan / Pakistan 
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in the War On Terror have been 
ongoing after Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Although the U.S.-led coalition 
forces managed to defeat the Taliban regime and dissolve the Taliban-led conventional 
forces, the war has since been turned into one against insurgency.  Al-Qaeda and other 
associated militant activities continue in the region.  Frequent clashes between the 
insurgents using guerilla-style attacks against the Allied peace-support forces have been 
on-going.  Increased warlord and Taliban activity, coupled with the growing illegal drug 
trade [42], and compounded by the fragile government, has resulted in Afghanistan 
becoming increasing unstable.   
Similarly, U.S. and Pakistani forces has been involved in trying to remove 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan’s 
Waziristan region, since the Pakistani Army launched a campaign against them in 2004.  
To date, the Taliban resistance still operates there.  
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The deployment of an ISR asset (Global Hawk or Global Observer type) 
would be able to significantly enhance the U.S. forces’ ISR capabilities in their War 
Against Terror.  In addition, with the heavy reliance on commercial satellite 
communications due to the lack of existing terrestrial networks, the Global Observer 
would also function as an airborne communications satellite for in-theatre 
communications.  The mission requires one UAV asset to cover this region. 
c. Iraq 
Since President George W. Bush’s declaration of the “end of major 
combat operations” [43] in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, insurgent forces have 
not ceased their guerilla-style attacks on both Allied peace-support forces, as well as 
against the newly installed Iraqi Security Forces.  This has significantly hampered the on-
going reconstruction efforts by the international community to repair and improve the 
infrastructure of Iraq after the war.   
Even with the installation of the new Iraqi government in May 2006, Iraq 
has continued to experience an increase in sectarian violence and attacks on the Allied 
coalition forces, leading to the United Nations to call it a “civil war-like situation and its 
people would become the victims of an unprecedented human rights catastrophe” [44].   
In a bid to curtail the violence in Iraq, President Bush announced that the 
United States would be “deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional 
soldiers and Marines to Iraq” at his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address [45].  
More than 3 months into the troop reinforcement, in June 2007, it was reported that the 
American and Iraqi troops “control fewer than one-third of the city’s neighborhoods, far 
short of the initial goal for the operation.” [46].  
Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize) [47] was 
started for the conduct of RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and 
Acquisition) operations in support of the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) 
fight in OIF.  The deployment of an ISR asset like the Global Hawk or Global Observer 
type would be able to significantly enhance the U.S. forces’ ISR capabilities in this effort.  
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In addition, with the heavy reliance on commercial satellite communications due to the 
lack of existing terrestrial networks, the Global Observer would also function as an 
airborne communications satellite for in-theatre communications.  The mission requires 
one UAV asset to cover this region. 
d. Colombia 
Colombia has been facing low intensity conflicts involving paramilitary 
militias and rebel guerilla groups for more than 40 years since the founding of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) in the mid-1960s.  These groups have been waging ongoing guerilla insurgency 
campaigns against successive Colombian governments [48].   
With the emergence of drug cartels from the late 1970s, and their 
strengthening in the 1980s and 1990s, the illegal drug trade in Colombia has remained 
very much alive up to today.  Through their sheer financial clout, they were able to 
finance and influence various paramilitary, guerillas and illegal armed groups.    
With the U.S. government at the forefront in the combat against the illegal 
drug trade, coupled with the need to stem the flow of illegal drugs into CONUS, the 
deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global Hawk or Global Observer type) enables 
special operation forces and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to operate in the 
region, and significantly enhances host nation’s capabilities in their combat against this 
illegal drug trade.  This mission requires one UAV asset to cover this region. 
e. Strait of Malacca 
The Strait of Malacca is one of the main water passageways between the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.  More than 30% of world commerce, and half of the 
world’s oil, pass through the narrow straits, with the narrowest point being only 1.5 
nautical miles (~2.8km) wide [49].  Disruptions to these vital sea lanes would have 
immediate economic and strategic repercussions that would be felt far beyond the South-
east Asian region. 
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The two-fold threats of terrorism and piracy along the Malacca and 
Singapore Strait is a threat to U.S. economic interest and is a threat to regional stability.  
The U.S. protection of the passage is a significant contribution to stability in the Far East.  
Therefore, U.S. interests in the region can be advanced by keeping a close watch on the 
region and working with the respective littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia to ensure the security of the Strait.  There has been an unspecified threat to 
shipping in the region.   
The deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global Hawk or Global Observer 
type) for round-the-clock surveillance of the region supports U.S. operations and 
coalition partners in the region.  This mission requires one UAV asset to cover this 
region. 
f. China / North Korea 
With North Korea’s withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in 2003, as well as its assertion that it currently possesses nuclear weapons (which 
remains unconfirmed), the U.S. is concerned over the possible proliferation of nuclear 
material and technology know-how by North Korea to interested countries like Iran and 
Syria.  There has been some success by the six-party talks (comprising the United States, 
North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia) in February 2007, culminating in a 
landmark action-for-action agreement [50].  While initial steps have been taken with the 
confirmation of the shut down of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor [51] in July 2007, this is 
but the start of a long process to achieve the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 
In the past, U.S.-China relations have generally been unpredictable, with 
mutual suspicion the order of the day.  However, U.S. relations with China have 
dramatically improved after China’s strong support for the War On Terrorism, post-9/11.  
Despite this warming of relations, there remain various thorny issues still to be resolved.  
Of great military concern are the following: 
• China’s increasing but unclear military spending [52]. 
• The protection of Taiwan from any potential invasion from China. 
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From the above, it is evident that the deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global 
Hawk or Global Observer type) for round-the-clock surveillance of the region would 
keep the U.S. updated on ground events.   This mission requires one UAV asset to cover 
this region. 
2. UAV Operating Bases 
For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that both the Global Hawk and the 
Global Observer missions can be launched from any one of the following 3 existing or 
designated-future Global Hawk operating bases.  These bases are: 
• Beale Air Force Base (California, USA) – Current Global Hawk Operating 
Base [53] 
• Anderson Air Force Base (Guam) – New Global Hawk Forward Operating 
Base to be ready in 2009. [54] 
• Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates) – Existing Expeditionary 
Global Hawk Forward Operating Base. [55] 
 
a. Beale Air Force Base (California, USA) 
Beale Air Force Base, located in California, was selected as the first 
Global Hawk main operating base in 2001, and is the home base of the 9th 
Reconnaissance Wing which operates the Global Hawk UAV. 
b. Anderson Air Force Base (Guam) 
Plans are currently underway to build maintenance facilities for the Global 
Hawk UAV in Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.  The facilities that would house up to 
seven Global Hawks are scheduled to be built by May 2009, with an expected cost of 
about $42M. 
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c. Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates) 
Since the early phases of Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S. 
Air Force has been operating both the U-2 and the Global Hawk UAV from the Al 
Dhafra Air Base in the UAE.   
It should be noted that the continued use of this base is subject to 
negotiations between the respective governments, and that although U.S. forces will 
likely continue to use this base, it need not be a permanent operating base like Beale 
(California) or Anderson (Guam). The UAE operations point to a need to maintain some 
level of expeditionary capability at both Beale and Anderson AFBs. This would be for 
contingency operations where relocation of UAV assets improves operational 
performance. 
3. Selection of UAV Operating Base  
The following Table 5 illustrates the distances [56] from the nearest operating 
base (correct to the nearest 10 nautical miles) to the various Areas of Operations (AO).  
For the purpose of distance computation, the following locations were used as proxy for 
the respective AO: 
• Trans-Sahara Region: Niger-Algeria-Mali boundary 
• Afghanistan / Pakistan: Kabul 
• Iraq: Baghdad 
• Colombia: Bogota 
• Strait of Malacca: Singapore 
• China / North Korea – Pyongyang 
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Table 5.   Selection of operating base to launch the UAV 
 Area of Operation Nearest UAV  Operating Base Distance (nm) 
1 Trans-Sahara Region Al Dhafra AB 2810 
2 Afghanistan / Pakistan Al Dhafra AB 980 
3 Iraq Al Dhafra AB 760 
4 Colombia Beale AFB 3290 
5 Strait of Malacca Anderson AFB 2540 
6 China / North Korea Anderson AFB 1860 
 
 The following Figure 7 shows the geographical locations of the various AO and 
the UAV operating bases. 
 
 
Figure 7.   World map [From 57] with annotation of UAV Operating bases and AO 
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B.  DATA ANALYSIS 
The following sections provide an analysis of the data based on the given 
operational scenario. 
1. Number of UAVs Required 
A typical mission sortie profile for the UAV is for it to be launched from its 
operating base, and ingress to the designated AO.  It will then loiter and perform its 
mission until it is time for it to return to the base, by which time another UAV would 
have arrived to take its place.  The first UAV will then egress and return to base for 
maintenance work.  The cycle continues for the second UAV, which will return only after 
a third UAV has reached the AO to take its place.  The following Figure 8 illustrates the 
typical mission sortie profile of the UAV. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Typical mission sortie profile of the UAV 
 
The following Table 6 summarizes the cruise speeds and flight endurance times 





UAV en route to 
AO from base 
UAV en route to 
base from AO 
UAV performs 






at base for 
maintenance 
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Table 6.   Cruise speed and endurance times for Global Hawk and Global Observer 
Attribute Global Hawk Global Observer 
Cruise Speed (knots) 340 110 
Endurance (hrs) 35 168 
 
The following key assumptions were made in the computation of the minimum 
number of UAVs required: 
• The returning UAV will have an hour of spare flight time (i.e., reserve fuel 
load) remaining when it arrives back at base.   
• The time required for maintenance is assumed to take an average of 36 
hours after each mission sortie.  This takes into account the fact that 
maintenance can be as short as a few hours (for normal refueling 
operations), or possibly as long as a week at a stretch (for complete 
structural maintenance and inspection) after the UAV is deployed for a 
certain number of missions.   
• Weather factors such as headwind or tailwind, which may affect the 
distance covered vis-à-vis the endurance of the UAV, is not taken into 
account in the analysis. 
• The time taken to climb to cruise altitude is assumed to be negligible 
compared to the UAV’s flight endurance.  This assumption is reasonable 
because the Global Hawk has a cruise altitude of 55,000 ft. and a climb 
rate of 3,400 feet per minute.  The time it takes for a Global Hawk to 
climb to cruise altitude is less than 20 minutes, compared to 35hrs. of 
flight endurance at cruise altitude. 
• Air spares for redundancy coverage is not required. 
• Ground spares were not included in the calculations at this point, but will 
be factored in subsequently for the mission to each of the AOs. 
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The following Figure 9 shows the number of UAVs required (excluding spares) 
for a 365/24/7 Time On-Station mission vis-à-vis the distance of the operating base from 
the AO.   
 
Figure 9.   Minimum number of aircraft required vs AO Distance 
 
For each AO, the number of UAVs required is computed based on the following 
formula: 
Number of UAVs Required 
Mission Cycle Time
=  x Number of UAVs required on-station 
UAV Time On-Station
    + 1 Ground Spare
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
where: 
Mission Cycle Time = UAV Time On-Station + UAV Transit Time 
                                    + UAV Maintenance Time 
 
 is the ceiling function of x x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
 
The UAV requirements are summarized in the following Table 7 as shown below: 
 37
Table 7.   UAV requirements for mission to respective AO 
 Area of Operation Distance (nm)
# GH  
Required 
(incl. spare) 
# GO  
Required 
(incl. spare) 
1 Trans-Sahara Region 2810 11 5 
2 Afghanistan / Pakistan 980 4 3 
3 Iraq 760 4 3 
4 Colombia 3290 6 3 
5 Strait of Malacca 2540 5 3 
6 China / North Korea 1860 5 3 
Total 35 20 
 
Based on the operational scenario considered, a total fleet size of 35 Global 
Hawks and 20 Global Observers are required to provide 24/7/365 ISR and 
communications capabilities. 
2. Number of Sorties Required Per Year by the UAVs  
It is useful to look at the required number of sorties to fulfill the operational 
requirements.  This measure of effectiveness will provide insights to the decision maker 
on the operational tempo and the potential differences in staffing requirements for the 
crew supporting the Global Observer vis-à-vis the Global Hawk.  As a quantum, the 
number of sorties is measured for continuous operations in the AO over the period of one 
year. 
The number of sorties required per year is computed based on the following 
formula: 
Number of Sorties Required Per Year
365 x 24
=  x Number of UAVs required on-station 
UAV Loiter Time
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
 
where: 
 is the ceiling function of x x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
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The following Figure 10 illustrates the number of sorties required per annum by 
both alternatives vis-à-vis the distance of the AO from the operating base. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Number of UAV sorties required per year vs AO distance 
 
 
For the operational scenario, Figure 11 illustrates the number of sorties required 
per annum by both UAVs to each of the AO.  To fly the entire operational scenario to all 




Figure 11.   Number of UAV sorties required per year for mission 
 
3. Utility of the UAVs  
With the given number of UAVs and sorties generated per year to maintain 
24/7/365 continuous coverage over their respective designated areas of operation, another 
useful MOE would be to compare the utility of the UAVs in performing their mission.  
The utility is defined as the proportion of time spent on-station by the UAV in 
performing its mission, i.e., time in the AO, over its mission cycle time, and is computed 
as follows: 
UAV Time On-Station
Utility of UAV = 
UAV Mission Cycle Time 
 
where: 
Mission Cycle Time = UAV Time On-Station + UAV Transit Time 
                                    + UAV Maintenance Time 
 
 




Figure 12.   Utility of UAV for mission 
 
4. Life Cycle Cost  
The Life Cycle Cost of the Global Observer UAS comprises the program 
acquisition cost, as well as the operations and support (O&S) cost (per UAV) over its 
lifespan [58], which is assumed to be over a period of 15 years.  The O&S cost is made 
up of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs as well as Personnel costs. 
To compute and compare the life cycle cost of the Global Observer vis-à-vis the 
Global Hawk, the following key cost considerations will be used.  Manpower costs are 
assumed to be the same for both, and it is not considered in this analysis.  Costs are 
computed in FY05$, assuming a discount factor of 5.05% per annum [1]. 
• Aircraft Cost 
• Launch and Recovery System (LRS), and Mission Control System (MCS) 
Costs 
• Payload Cost 
• Fuel Cost 
• Maintenance and Repair Costs 
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a. Aircraft Cost  
The cost of the Global Observer, based on the production of at least 10 
aircraft, is estimated to be $14.2M for the GO-1, and $18.5M for the GO-2 [59], whereas 
the cost of the RQ-4B Global Hawk is approximately $35M per aircraft [60]. 
b. Launch and Recovery System, Mission Control System Costs 
Taking into account the fact that the Launch and Recovery System (LRS) 
and the Mission Control System (MCS) do not follow a 1:1 relationship with the number 
of UAVs, it is assumed that the cost of the LRS and MCS comes up to 10% of the total 
platform cost for both the Global Hawk and the Global Observer.   Hence, the LRS and 
MCS costs are estimated to be $3.5M for each Global Hawk and $1.4M for each Global 
Observer in the inventory. 
c. Payload Cost 
For all missions, it is assumed that since both the Global Hawk and the 
Global Observer perform similar missions, they would carry similar payloads, and this 
payload cost is assumed to be $5M4 [61]. 
d. Fuel Cost 
The Global Hawk is powered by JP-8, the standard aviation fuel used by 
all U.S. Air Force aircraft since 1996.  The unburdened cost of JP-8 is $2.31/gallon for 
FY 2008 [62].  Taking the specific gravity of JP-8 to be 0.80 [63], the unburdened cost of 
JP-8 is computed to be $0.35/pound based on the following formula: 
Cost of Liquid Fuel in pounds
    = Specific Gravity of Fuel  Gallon to Pound Factor 





                                                 
4 Global Hawk’s Integrated Sensor Suite costs about $12M in mid-2002 [From  61].  Global 
Observer’s payload cost is assumed to be about $5M based on their smaller payload size compared to the 
Global Hawk.   
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 = Gallon to Pound Factor 8.3452641  
A report from OUSD(AT&L) estimated the burdened cost of JP-8 to be 
about $17.50/gallon [64], or about $2.62/pound.   
It is estimated that the fuel capacity of the Global Hawk is about 15,000 
lbs of JP-8.  Using the formulae: 
Cost of Fuel per sortie
    = Burdened Cost of Fuel per pound  Fuel Capacity of UAV×  
and 
Cost of Fuel per year
    = Cost of Fuel per sortie  Number of sorties per year×  
The burdened cost of fuel per sortie for the Global Hawk is about $39,300 
per sortie.  For 3051 Global Hawk sorties, which comes up to a fuel requirement of 38.2 
million lbs. of JP-8, the cost of JP-8 is about $120.0M per annum. 
The unburdened cost of LH2 is $3.00/pound for FY 2008 [65].  With the 
Department of Energy’s new hydrogen cost goal [66] of $2.00-3.00/gge (delivered, 
untaxed, FY05$, by 2015), which is independent of the pathway used to produce and 
deliver hydrogen, the cost of liquid hydrogen is expected to drop in future.  A similar cost 
factor for the unburdened and burdened cost of JP-8 (1:7.6) was used as the basis to 
estimate the burdened cost of LH2.  Based on this, the burdened cost for LH2 is estimated 
to be about $22.70/pound. 
It is estimated that the fuel capacity of the Global Observer is about 
1000lbs. of LH2.  Using the similar equations, the burdened cost of LH2 per sortie for the 
Global Observer is computed to be $22,700.  For 490 GO sorties, which come up to a 
fuel requirement of 490,000 lbs. of LH2, the cost is about $11.1M per annum. 
The following Table 8 summarizes the results: 
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Table 8.   Annual fuel cost incurred by the UAVs 
UAV Fuel Unburdened 
Fuel Cost   
[$ per lb] 
Burdened 
Fuel Cost 
[$ per lb] 
Usage 
per 

















Hawk JP-8 0.35 2.62 15000 39.3 3051 120.0 
Global 
Observer LH2 3.00 22.70 1000 22.7 490 11.1 
 
e. Maintenance and Repair Costs 
Based on analysis of historical data (FY05 and FY06) [67] for the Global 
Hawk, the annual maintenance and repair cost is found to be about 10% of the cost of the 
operating inventory (taken to be the aircraft, LRC, MCS and payload).  It is assumed that 
this rate holds for both the Global Hawk and the Global Observer.  Hence, the annual 
maintenance and repair cost is estimated to be about a tenth of the cost of the respective 
platforms, i.e., $4.4M for each Global Hawk and $2.1M for each Global Observer. 
The following Table 9 illustrates the total costs to purchase and operate 
the respective UAVs over 15 years.  This is for the operational scenario based on the 
respective cost elements.  It is assumed that the fuel costs and the maintenance costs 
remain constant over the 15-year period. 
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Table 9.   Costs to purchase and operate the UAVs over 15 years  
[CY, FY05$M] 





UAV Cost 284.0 1225.0 76.8% 
LRS + MCS Cost 28.0 122.5 76.8% 
Payload Cost 100.0 175.0 42.9% 
Fuel Cost 99.4 1070.5 90.7% 
Maintenance and Repair Cost 368.0 1358.6 72.9% 
Total Cost 879.8 3951.5 77.7% 
 
The estimated cost to purchase and operate the Global Observer for 15 
years is $879.8M (2005$), compared to the Global Hawk’s cost of $3951.5M (2005$).  
This translates to a savings of 77.7%.  The following Table 10 illustrates the overall Life 
Cycle Cost Table for both the Global Observer and the Global Hawk.  
 
Life cycle cost table for the UAVs over 15 years  
[CY, FY05$M] 
LCCE (FY05$M) 







Investment 412.4 1522.5 1110.1 72.9% 
Operations & Support 467.4 2429.0 1961.7 80.8% 






5. Cost of Leased Commercial Satellite Communications 
Figure 13 illustrates the commercial satellite communications bandwidth usage.  
The high bandwidth consumed from 2003 to 2005 in the Middle East / Africa region is 
due largely to the significant bandwidth requirements resulting from OIF / OEF.  In 
FY05, the bandwidth consumed was more than 2500MHz. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Commercial satellite bandwidth usage by region [From 12, Fig 4-15] 
 
The corresponding expenditure incurred by the DoD for the commercial satellite 
bandwidth consumption is as shown in Figure 14 below.  For FY05, the expenditure for 
the Middle East / Africa region was in excess of $80M. 
 




It is conservatively estimated that due to the lack of terrestrial communications 
networks in the Middle East / Africa area of operations, in-theatre battlefield 
communications account for 50% of the total commercial satellite bandwidth consumed.  
Hence, based on the FY05 data, the cost of leased commercial satellite bandwidth is 
estimated to be $40M. For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that the bandwidth 
usage for in-theatre communications remains constant at $40M per annum for subsequent 
years.  This translates to a potential savings of $40M per annum, as well as the fact that 
more of the scarce satellite communications bandwidth resources can now be used for 
inter-AO or reach-back communications. 
C.  RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
The approach for the Return-on-Investment (ROI) analysis is to establish a base 
case with quantitative benefits that can be attributed to the operational deployment of the 
Global Observer vis-à-vis the use of Global Hawk, as well as the potential savings in 
commercial satellite communications utilization. 
1. Base Case Benefits 
A summary of the benefits is listed in Table 11.  For the base case, the following 
benefits are considered: 
• Other than satellites, no other existing platforms are able to provide 
24/7/365 persistent capability over any given area of interest.   Although 
the Global Hawk can be used to perform such missions, it has not 
happened in real-life operations due to the high associated costs.  Instead, 
the Global Hawk had only been deployed for specific missions and only 
for a limited period of time. 
• On a per UAV basis, the investment cost required for a Global Observer is 
59.4% cheaper than the Global Hawk.  For 24/7/365 persistent capability 
based on the scenario, the estimated investment savings is 76.8%.  (See 
Table 11) 
 47
• Fuel cost for the Global Observer is estimated to be 90.7% cheaper than 
for the Global Hawk.  (See Table 11) 
• Maintenance and Repair cost for the Global Observer is estimated to be 
72.9% cheaper than for the Global Hawk.  (See Table 11) 
• The number of sorties required to be flown for the Global Observer is 
estimated to be 83.9% less than for the Global Hawk.  As a significant 
proportion of aircraft damage is caused during takeoff and landings, this 
huge reduction in the number of sorties to be flown will invariably result 
in a lower logistic footprint required to support the operation. 
• In areas of operation where there is a lack of terrestrial communication 
networks, the Global Observer can now provide high-bandwidth 
battlefield communications for intra-theatre communications, compared to 
existing low-bandwidth satellite communications. 
• Savings can also be achieved in the form of cost avoidance for the 
expenditure on commercial satellite communications bandwidth for in-
theatre communications (conservatively estimated to be 50% of the total 
expenditure) in the Middle-East / Africa region.  (See Table 11) 
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Table 10.   Summary of the benefits of Global Observer 
S/No. Benefit Description Remarks 
1. Provide 24/7/365 ISR capability New Capability 
2. Savings in investment cost  76.8% 
3. Savings in fuel cost  90.7% 
4. Savings in maintenance and repair 72.9% 
5. Reduced number of sorties flown 83.9% 




7. Savings in usage and expenditure 
on commercial satellite 
communications bandwidth  
50% 
 
2. Base Case ROI 
The base case ROI was computed over a period of 15 years from FY09 (when the 
Global Observer is first expected to be delivered), with base year of FY05.  The budget 
appropriation / cost element is based on Operations and Management (Purchases), with 
the discount factor set at 5.05% [1].  The savings attained by the Global Observer would 
be compared against that of the Global Hawk for 24/7/365 surveillance and 
communications networking missions.   
The ROI computation will be performed for two cases (1) the first which does not 
include the estimated $40M cost avoidance for not using commercial satellite bandwidth 
and (2) the second which does include the cost avoidance.  The first case takes into 
account the fact that the Global Hawk can, in theory, also be used to provide the required 
in-theater battlefield communications networking.  
A summary of the key parameters used in the ROI computation are given below: 
• The estimated investment cost of the Global Observer is $412.4M while 
the cost to operate it over 15 years is $467.4M.  (From Table 10) 
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• The estimated investment cost of the Global Hawk is $1522.5M while the 
cost to operate it over 15 years is $2429.0M.  (From Table 10) 
• The estimated expenditure for in-theatre usage of commercial satellite 
bandwidth over 15 years is $386.4M. 





Net Present Value of SavingsROI = 1
Net Present Value of Investment
3951.5M - 879.8M        = 1
412.4M
        = 14.3%
⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
A 14.3% annualized return on investment is obtained, based on NPV Savings of 
$3071.8M and NPV Investment of $412.4M.  If the cost avoidance for in-theater 
commercial satellite communications bandwidth is taken into account, the annualized 
return on investment is 15.2%. 
D.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The purpose of sensitivity analysis is to study how the variation of input model 
parameters will affect the outputs.  In this way, assumptions used in the model can be 
scrutinized to see how the uncertainty in the input parameters can affect the model 
outputs.  The sensitivity analysis provides confidence to the decision maker on the 
robustness of the model with regard to varying input parameters.  For this study, the 
factors to be varied are as follows: 
• Discount Factor - To be varied from 3% to 10%.  A large discount factor 
would affect the computed benefits for the Global Observer in terms of 
total costs.  However, it is not expected to significantly affect the 
computed ROI, as Global Hawk would also face a similar discount. 
• Investment and Maintenance Costs – To be varied from a factor of 1 to 2.  
A higher investment cost would also correspondingly affect the LRS/MCS 
and maintenance and repair costs, which will invariably affect the 
computed benefits for the Global Observer.   
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• LH2 Fuel Costs – To be varied from a factor of 1 to 3.  A higher LH2 fuel 
cost would result in a higher operational cost, thereby affecting the 
computed benefits for the Global Observer.   
It is to be highlighted that the ROI analysis is strictly based on quantifiable 
measures such as cost savings, and does not take into account operational benefits and 
other unquantifiable benefits such as the increased wear and possible loss of UAVs due to 
sortie take-offs and landings. 
1. Discount Factor 
The following Figure 15 illustrates the estimated total costs for the purchase and 
15-year operation for both the Global Hawk and the Global Observer when the discount 
factor varies from 3% to 10%.   
 
Figure 15.   Discount factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] 
 
Figure 16 below illustrates the annualized ROI for the Global Observer based on 
varying the Discount Factor.  Even with a discount factor of 10%, the annualized ROI for 




Figure 16.   Discount factor analysis on annualized ROI 
 
2. Investment and Operation Cost 
Figure 17 illustrates the estimated total costs for the Global Observer vis-à-vis the 
Global Hawk when the Investment and corresponding Operation Costs of the Global 
Observer vary by a factor of 1 to 2.   
 
Figure 17.   Cost factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] for the Global Observer 
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Figure 18 below illustrates the annualized ROI for the Global Observer based on 
varying the Cost Factor.  It is observed that the annualized ROI does not fall below 8.5%, 
even if the investment and operations cost of the Global Observer reaches a factor of 2.0 
from the current estimated cost of $14.2M per aircraft (case without commercial satellite 
bandwidth savings).  This indicates that the Global Observer is indeed a cost-attractive 
investment.   
 
Figure 18.   Cost factor analysis on annualized ROI for the Global Observer 
 
3. LH2 Fuel Cost 
The analysis varies the LH2 cost, while maintaining a constant cost of JP-8.  
Figure 19 illustrates the estimated total costs for the Global Observer vis-à-vis the Global 
Hawk when the LH2 cost for the Global Observer vary by a factor of 1 to 3.   
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Figure 19.   Fuel cost factor analysis on total costs [FY05$M] for the Global Observer 
 
Figure 20 below illustrates the annualized ROI for the Global Observer based on 
varying the Fuel Cost Factor.  It is observed that the change in annualized ROI for the 
Global Observer does not vary significantly (does not fall below 13.8%), due to the fact 
that fuel costs account for only about 10% of the total costs.   
 
 
Figure 20.   Fuel cost factor analysis on annualized ROI for the Global Observer 
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E.  RISK ANALYSIS 
While performing analysis on the cost and the return on investment for the Global 
Observer is necessary for any business case analyses, it would be pertinent to also 
examine the potential risks involved in a new and unproven technology.  The following 
are potential sources of risk for the Global Observer: 
1. Reliability of the Technology 
While the technology for powering platforms using liquid hydrogen is fairly 
mature, there has not been any prototype that has demonstrated such ground-breaking 
capabilities.  The only demonstration so far by the Global Observer prototype was a one-
day flight performed in 2005.  Hence, the reliability of the platform to perform as well as 
it claims remains unproven. 
2. Logistical Support 
LH2 has traditionally been used as a propellant for missiles and other space-borne 
platforms.  As such, the operating procedures for the use of LH2 as a fuel have already 
been formalized.  However, infrastructure and logistical support issues also need to be 
examined, as these issues may inhibit the deployment and support of the Global 
Observer, especially in OCONUS forward operating bases. 
 55
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The report has presented a generic structure for performing a business case 
analysis, with specific application to the Global Observer JCTD.  The BCA compares the 
performance of Global Observer with Global Hawk (augmented with existing 
commercial satellite communications networks) in an operational scenario consisting of a 
24/7/365 ISR and communications mission.  Life Cycle Costs (LCC) consist of 
investment costs, as well as the costs to operate the platform over a 15-year period. 
The key results of the business case analyses are summarized as follows: 
A. PERFORMANCE 
• A total of 20 Global Observers were required (including 6 ground spares 
for each of the AOs considered) for the mission, compared to 35 Global 
Hawks (including the 6 ground spares). 
• A total of 490 Global Observer sorties were required, compared to 3051 
for the Global Hawk.  This translates to a cost savings of 90.7% on fuel 
costs. 
• For the various areas of operation, the utility (defined as the proportion of 
time spent on-station by the UAV in performing its mission, i.e., time in 
the AO, over its mission cycle time) of the Global Observer ranged from 
0.53 to 0.75, compared to 0.21 to 0.42 for the Global Hawk. 
B. COST BENEFITS 
• The estimated life cycle cost comparison (less manpower costs) over a 15-
year period between the Global Observer and the Global Hawk are 
summarized in the following Table 12.   
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Table 11.   LCC comparison between Global Observer and Global Hawk 
LCCE (FY05$M) 







Investment 412.4 1522.5 1110.1 72.9% 
Operations & 
Support 467.4 2429.0 1961.7 80.8% 
Total 879.8 3951.5 3071.8 77.7% 
 
• The estimated cost to purchase and operate the Global Observer for 15 
years is $879.8M (FY05$), compared to the Global Hawk’s cost of 
$3951.5M (FY05$).  This translates to a savings of 77.7%. 
• There is also an estimated potential cost avoidance of about $40M per 
annum on commercial satellite bandwidth usage if the Global Observer 
can be deployed to provide tactical battlefield communications over the 
area of interest, in addition to its regular ISR mission. 
• The base case annualized compounded Return on Investment (ROI) (over 
a 15-year period from FY09) is 14.3%, based on a Net Present Value 
(NPV) savings of $3071.8M and NPV Investment of $412.4M.   
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
• The base case annualized ROI never falls below 12.4% when the discount 
factor for the Global Observer was varied from 3.0% to 10%. 
• The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 8.5%, even when the 
cost factor for the Global Observer is increased to double the current 
estimated cost.   
• The base case annualized ROI does not fall below 13.8% when the fuel 
cost of LH2 was varied from 1 to 3 times the current estimated burdened 
cost of $22.70 per pound, while maintaining a constant JP-8 burdened cost 
of $17.50 per gallon. 
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D. RISK ANALYSIS 
• The reliability of the technology to achieve 7 days flight endurance 
remains unproven, as there was no demonstrator that has achieved such a 
capability.  
• For operational deployment, it is necessary to also look into the 
infrastructure and logistical support requirements, especially with regard 
to LH2 handling, to adequately support the Global Observer for missions 
from OCONUS forward operating bases. 
E. BOTTOMLINE 
The benefits of the Global Observer should not be limited to the factors presented 
in this study, as these factors are by no means a comprehensive list of factors by which 
the Global Observer ought to be measured.  The very concept of a HALE UAV achieving 
7 days flight endurance is already a ground-breaking capability, especially since 
currently, operational UAVs can achieve no more than 2 days of flight endurance.    
The Global Observer, with its prolonged persistence (7 days) and flexibility in 
payload configuration, appears to be a worthwhile investment that can provide the DoD 
with a new capability in round-the-clock ISR and battlefield communications. 
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